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Abstract  
 
Freshwater scarcity is an increasingly important aspect of the international 
relations of the Middle East and North Africa, and is magnified when sources 
are shared between states. In the Jordanian, Israeli and Syrian cases, most of 
their freshwater sources are shared. At the same time, cooperation between 
these states has emerged. This paper examines inter-state cooperation by 
considering freshwater scarcity issues in Jordanian-Israeli-Syrian relations. 
This study argues that three factors help determine whether freshwater 
scarcity leads to conflict or cooperation between riparian states: the nature 
and intensity of the scarcity, the level of interdependence between the actors 
sharing this resource, and their level of engagement in international 
institutions. It concludes that cooperation is possible between states (even 
those with difficulties in other areas of their relationship) when the scarcity 
experienced is intense, they are interdependent in this and other spheres, and 
they engage with each other through international institutions. 
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In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the potential for inter- and intra-state conflict 
remains a key feature of the region’s international relations. The traditional causes of conflict 
seen in the region over the late nineteenth and through the twentieth century in many ways 
still remain important in the early twenty-first century. However, in addition to the traditional 
causes of conflict we can now argue that concern for access to sources of freshwater both 
within states and across state boundaries is increasingly important.1 Control of territory in the 
MENA region is, in many ways, now less significant as a potential cause of conflict than in 
times past due to the combined impact of a number of processes. These include the embedded 
nature of existing states and state structures, interdependence, and mutual governmental 
recognition.2 However, control over natural resources, and in particular freshwater sources, is 
increasingly a potential cause of conflict.3 Growing populations, increasing industrial activity, 
urban sprawl, and environmental change are leading to massive shortages of freshwater 
supplies across the region.4 This is, no doubt, not a problem faced by the MENA region alone. 
Throughout the world, processes directly and indirectly linked to human activity are leading 
to such shortages. The resulting conflict is also not unique to the MENA region. However, the 
often fragile nature of inter- and intra-state relations in this region means that the impact of 
freshwater shortages is magnified. Jordan finds itself in what is arguably the most freshwater-
scarce sub-region of the MENA and, along with its immediate neighbours to the west and 
north, faces acute problems as a result.  
We must note here that it is not always the case that shortages of natural resources 
such as freshwater lead to conflict. While this can be seen to be true in a number of instances 
the opposite is also true. Indeed, relations between states, as well as between peoples, can also 
be characterised by cooperation and understanding when shared resources are scarce.5 This 
paper argues that three factors determine whether freshwater scarcity leads to international 
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conflict or cooperation: firstly, the nature of the scarcity itself; secondly, the level of 
interdependence between the actors sharing this resource; and thirdly, the level of engagement 
by these actors with each other through international institutions. This latter point refers 
primarily to institutions related to the specific issue of freshwater scarcity but also to the 
broader engagement these states have with other international institutions. Furthermore, it is 
argued here that where resource scarcity exists but interdependence or engagement with 
international institutions do not, then the risk of conflict is higher than when all three factors 
are present. At the same time, resource scarcity and interdependence alone are not as effective 
in ensuring cooperation over matters of freshwater scarcity as when all three conditions exist. 
Jordan is one of the world’s most freshwater scarce states and the issue of managing its main 
sources of freshwater with its neighbours is a key challenge the Jordanian government faces. 
As such, Jordan represents a good case study to use in order to explore this hypothesis. This 
paper uses theories of resource scarcity and institutionalism to examine two key international 
projects aimed at managing shared freshwater sources and reducing the problem of freshwater 
scarcity: the first being the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit Project on the Jordanian-Israeli-
Palestinian border and the second being the joint Jordanian-Syrian project to construct the 
Wehdeh Dam on the Yarmouk River on their shared border. 
 
Resource Scarcity as a Catalyst for Change 
 
It is useful to consider resource scarcity theory to analyse the impact of freshwater scarcity on 
international relations. This is because resource scarcity can be an important influence on 
changes in the politics and economics that govern resource use. Also, in many parts of the 
world, resource degradation has become irreversible. In these areas, resource degradation has 
become an exogenous variable in the political activity of states in regional systems.6 There are 
three main schools of thought on the importance of resource scarcity.7 Firstly, there are the 
Neo-Malthusians, who claim that finite resources place limits on the growth of human 
population and consumption. If these limits are exceeded, the result will be widespread 
poverty and social breakdown.8 On the other hand, neoclassical economists say there are few, 
if any, strict limitations on human population, consumption, or prosperity. They argue that 
properly functioning economic institutions, especially markets, encourage conservation, 
resource distribution, and the development of alternative sources of scarce resources.9 Finally, 
Thomas Homer-Dixon has identified a third group whom he calls the “distributionists.” For 
this group, the real issue is the maldistribution of resources and wealth, although they do 
concede that there may be some resource limitations to human growth.10 
Over the next few decades, the MENA region’s renewable resources, such as arable 
land, forests and supplies of freshwater, will dwindle further. At the same time, higher rates of 
consumption of these resources can cause resource scarcities. These scarcities impose costs 
on societies, thereby affecting state behaviour by placing demands and constraints on 
governments. These environmental resource scarcities are the result of three main factors: 
environmental change, human population growth, and unequal distribution of resources. The 
concept of resource scarcity encompasses all three. Environmental change refers to the 
human-induced reduction in the quantity and/or quality of a renewable resource faster than 
that resource is renewed by natural processes. Homer-Dixon highlights that population 
growth reduces the per capita availability of a renewable resource by dividing that resource 
between more people. Unequal distribution of renewable resources affects scarcity as it 
concentrates the resource, supplying few while subjecting many to greater scarcity. Homer-
Dixon explains the relationship between these causes of resource scarcity and its extent as 
follows: “reduction in the quantity or quality of a resource shrinks the resource pie, while 
population growth divides the pie into smaller slices for each individual, and unequal resource 
distribution means that some groups get disproportionately large slices.”11 Nevertheless, 
analysts have tended to study resource depletion and population growth in isolation from the 
political economy of resource distribution. Incorporating these three distinct sources of 
scarcity into one analysis gives us a theoretical approach to resource scarcity which can be 
used to study the relationship between resource scarcity and the onset of conflict.12 
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The three sources of resource scarcity often interact. Homer-Dixon has identified two 
specific patterns of interaction, which he calls “resource capture” and “ecological 
marginalisation.”13 By “resource capture,” Homer-Dixon means a group’s shifting of resource 
distribution in favour of itself. The quality and quantity of a resource coupled with the 
population growth encourage the powerful group (or groups) within a single state or states in 
a regional system to acquire more resources. This results in a decrease in the amount of scarce 
resource available to weaker groups. “Ecological marginalisation” is when migration to 
regions that are ecologically fragile occurs. Such migration is a result of unequal resource 
distribution combined with high population growth causing high population densities in these 
areas. Jordan is a prime example as it is subject to both resource capture and ecological 
marginalisation. The Kingdom’s stronger upstream neighbours exploit the waters of the two 
major international river systems that the country depends on. Israel in particular has been a 
major proponent of resource capture. Up until the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force 
from southern Lebanon in 2000, Israel held all the major upstream tributaries and freshwater 
sources on the Jordan River as well as all aquifers west of the Jordan Valley (which it still 
holds). Within Jordan itself, where the majority of the population lives in the north-west of 
the country close to the three major surface water supplies—the Yarmouk, Jordan, and Zarqa 
Rivers—this is termed ecological marginalisation. 
Freshwater scarcity is perhaps the most pressing resource scarcity issue for many of 
the world’s regions with water demand doubling every two decades or so. In particular, river 
water is an important issue.14 Resource scarcity in developing regions has a greater impact on 
the international political economy of the region. This is because developing states are, in 
general, more vulnerable than advanced states to resource scarcity as they cannot afford to 
develop the infrastructure and technological means to replace the scarce resource or mitigate 
the subsequent environmental, social, and economic impacts of the scarcity. A range of 
resource scarcity issues could produce four main causally interrelated social effects in 
developing regions: reduced agricultural production; economic decline; population 
displacement; and the disruption of regular, legitimised social relations. These could lead in 
turn to a number of specific types of acute conflict, including scarcity disputes between states, 
intra-state conflict between differing groups (including ethnic groups), and civil strife.15 
Thomas Homer-Dixon has developed a model that shows how resource scarcity can 
cause conflict. He suggests that the effect of human activity on the environment in a particular 
region causes environmental change and is a function of two variables: the total population 
size and physical activity per capita, along with the vulnerability of the ecosystem in that 
region to those activities.16 His model demonstrates that environmental factors cause social 
factors that lead to conflict. From this model we can ask the general question of “how” 
resource scarcity may lead to conflict by dividing it into two specific questions. First, what 
are the social effects of environmental change? Second, what types of acute conflict, if any, 
will result from these changes?  
The four principle social effects caused by resource scarcity together or 
independently may increase the probability of acute conflict. To begin with, there may be a 
reduction in agricultural production. This is perhaps the most important result of resource 
scarcity. Secondly, the state may witness an economic decline which is especially important 
when studying the potential for conflict between developing states because resource scarcity 
can result in the further impoverishment of developing societies. In Homer-Dixon’s model, 
economic productivity may be influenced directly by environmental disruption or indirectly 
via other social effects such as decreased agricultural production.17 In the case of a developing 
state like Jordan, this is of paramount importance. The third social effect is population 
displacement. Resource scarcity can cause vast numbers of environmental refugees or 
displaced people. For example, spreading deserts may cause people to migrate to more arable 
lands.18 The final social effect identified is the disruption of social relations and institutions. 
In many developing states, the previous three social effects are likely to disrupt the norms of 
custom and habitual behaviour. A decrease in agricultural output, for example, may 
encourage people to leave a community, thereby breaking down the community’s structure. 
Economic decline may weaken the national tax base and undermine financial, legal, and 
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political institutions. Mass migration from one region to another may disrupt class relations, 
labour markets, and resource supply. We can thus identify three types of resource scarcity-
related conflicts. The decrease in physically controllable resources, such as freshwater, can 
provoke inter-state simple-scarcity conflicts or resource wars. Secondly, large movements of 
people caused by environmental stress can lead to group identity conflicts that are 
characterised by ethnic clashes. Thirdly, there are relative deprivation conflicts, where 
resource scarcity simultaneously increases economic deprivation and disrupts key social 
institutions.  
Nevertheless, the immediate result of resource scarcity may not be direct inter-state 
conflict over such resources. Rather, resource scarcity causes internal instability within the 
state, and it is this that results either in intra-state or inter-state conflict. Inter-state conflict 
over scarce resources becomes a viable option when a state experiences a large amount of 
internal instability as a result of resources being scarce. For example, resource scarcity 
reduces food production, aggravates poverty and disease, spurs large migrations, and 
undermines a government’s moral authority and capacity to govern. Over time, these stresses 
negatively affect the society’s social fabric. This is a problem felt most in developing states 
and causes chronic instability. Governments are forced to act to re-establish legitimacy and 
stability. This may mean going to war in order to secure the resources needed. With regards to 
shared river systems, wars between upstream and downstream riparian states on an 
international river system will only occur under certain conditions. Firstly, the downstream 
riparian must be extremely dependent on the water for its national well-being. Additionally, 
the upstream state must be able and willing to restrict the flow of the river before it reaches 
the downstream riparian. There must also be a history of antagonism between the riparian 
states. Most importantly, the downstream riparian must be militarily capable of taking 
successful action against the upstream state.19 Jordanian military capabilities are limited 
compared to both Israel and Syria, the upstream riparian states on the Jordan and Yarmouk 
river systems, suggesting that decision-makers in Amman would not consider military 
engagements a viable policy option, thus reducing the chance of conflict instigated by Jordan.   
Furthermore, the use of military force to gain scarce renewable resources is hindered 
by a number of other factors. Firstly, states cannot easily convert renewable resources into 
increased state power in a short period of time, and freshwater is no exception. The 
acquisition of cropland or freshwater supplies, for example, will have an impact on the state’s 
economy but only after a number of years. States can, on the other hand, increase their power 
by gaining non-renewable resources such as iron ore, which can be used to manufacture 
military hardware. Secondly, states that are heavily dependent on renewable resources tend to 
be under-developed and therefore not as powerful as more developed states. This means that 
they tend not to have the means to buy large quantities of sophisticated military equipment 
with which they can threaten their neighbours. Due to these reasons, inter-state conflict over 
renewable resources is less likely than for non-renewable resources. 
In considering the negative impacts of freshwater scarcity on relations between states 
in the MENA region, it is relatively easy to find cases which indicate that access to scarce 
resources can catalyse conflict. However, it is perhaps more interesting and more dramatic to 
consider the effect of resource scarcity on maintaining existing conflicts and/or limiting the 
potential for cooperation. Where conflict exists or has existed between two or more regional 
states, access to freshwater has traditionally not been identified as the core catalyst,20 but it 
has been considered as a key factor in reinforcing bad relations. In Jordanian-Israeli relations, 
both Israelis and Jordanians suffer from an acute shortage of freshwater supplies. Within 
historic Palestine (which here refers to the modern states of Israel, parts of Jordan and the 
Palestinian Territories) there are few sources of freshwater, with the largest individual sources 
found in the West Bank in the form of aquifers. The main surface sources of this area of the 
Mashreq are the Jordan, Yarmouk, and Litani rivers with the former flowing from the Sea of 
Galilee/Lake Tiberias down to the Dead Sea, forming part of the border between Israel, 
Jordan and the West Bank. The Yarmouk River flows along the border between Jordan and 
Syria and Syria and Israel, and the Litani River flows in southern Lebanon and northern 
Israel. Both Jordan and Israel use the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmouk and their linked 
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basin systems. Within Israel proper there are very few natural sources of freshwater. 
Likewise, in Jordan there are also very few other sources of surface and ground water, with 
the Disi aquifer in the south of the country being the largest example of the latter. Apart from 
the history of military engagement and the state of war that existed between Jordan and Israel 
from 1948 until the 1994 peace treaty, these actors are deeply intertwined in terms of where 
they get their freshwater from and how they use this resource.21 This has often led to 
problems between the two states and has been one of the issues impacting upon the 
normalisation of inter-governmental relations between them. This is discussed further below.  
 
Interdependence, Institutionalism and Cooperation 
 
In 1998, Robert Keohane22 revisited a discussion that he and Joseph Nye23 had engaged in 
some years before on the importance of international institutions for maintaining world order. 
In this second discussion, Keohane argued that international institutions (international 
organizations and regimes) increased in importance in the post-Cold War era and had become 
embedded features of international relations. Furthermore, Keohane concluded that some 
institutions are more effective than others partly because of “the degree of common interests 
and the distribution of power among members.”24 While some institutions are not effective, 
Keohane still concludes that interdependence between states and peoples is a key aspect of 
the modern world, and that its management can be beneficial in promoting international 
cooperation. Vivien Schmidt takes this discussion further by exploring the ways in which 
ideas and discourse are utilized in institutional settings to promote their effectiveness. 
Schmidt demonstrates that the ways in which ideas and discourse are perceived by 
institutional members also plays a role in institutional effectiveness.25 International 
organizations have proliferated rapidly in the past three decades, increasing in number from 
approximately 300 in the early 1980s to well over 6,000 by 2013. Furthermore, membership 
of these international organizations has also expanded rapidly. Randall Stone has considered 
the proliferation of international organizations and increases in membership while at the same 
time exploring why international institutions do not always work effectively.26 Stone argues 
that “International institutions can only facilitate cooperation when there are common 
objectives to be achieved,” but that international institutions have often also been ineffective 
even when common goals are present.27 
While acknowledging the importance of investigating the nature of interdependence 
that exists between states in any given relationship, Stone argues that this is not enough to 
understand the failures of international institutions. In order to develop an analysis that 
explains why and how international institutions are effective, it is also necessary to consider 
the power capabilities of the actors involved as well as the nature of the institutions 
themselves.28 We can add to this the need to consider how the experiences of shared 
engagement with international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
the United Nations (UN) can influence willingness to engage in new institutional 
arrangements. International trade is perhaps the most significant form of international 
relationship in terms of influencing levels of interdependence and engagement in international 
institutions. Susan McMillan highlights that interdependence as measured by international 
trade has been widely acknowledged as reducing prospects for conflict between trade 
partners.29 McMillan also argues that further study is needed to explore this connection by 
looking at the costly aspects of economic interdependence as well as the benefits. However, 
studying governmental engagement with international institutions more generally speaking—
including those governing trade, cultural heritage, education, environmental protection, and 
so on—can only present us with a limited number of valid insights into bilateral 
cooperation/conflict over resources. Likewise, simply considering levels of economic 
integration between states limits our ability to understand these relations. In order to gain a 
greater insight into the role of institutional engagement and the interdependence that follows 
from it, it is necessary for this study to consider institutions that are directly related to 
freshwater resource management. This includes governmental engagement with international 
organizations that deal with freshwater issues as well as bilateral agreements.  
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When states that share sources of freshwater face a situation of scarcity and do not 
engage with each other in an institutional setting, the challenges of managing the scarcity 
problem are magnified. Then again, when states do engage with each other through the use of 
mechanisms such as inter-governmental agreements and joint committees dealing with 
freshwater management, they are able to increase their ability to deal with their freshwater 
scarcity problems.30 Furthermore, when states engage with bilateral and multilateral 
institutions, including large international organisations like the UN and World Bank, their 
ability to coordinate effective responses to freshwater scarcity tends to increase. Of particular 
importance here are the positive benefits of establishing procedures and mechanisms for 
communication and coordination between governments (the area of discussion is not 
necessarily relevant) as well as the increased access to financial, technical, and material 
resources provided by actors in the broader international community. For example, as is 
discussed in more detail below, World Bank funding and organisational support for the Red 
Sea-Dead Sea Conduit project is essential to the implementation of the scheme.  
 
Jordanian-Israeli Collaboration: The Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit Project 
 
One example of international collaboration as a result of resource scarcity is the Red Sea-
Dead Sea Conduit project. This project was first suggested over a decade ago to provide 
freshwater for Jordan, Israel, and Palestine, but failed to materialise due to political tensions. 
However, the last few years have seen progress with feasibility and design studies for the 
project near completion.31 The intended canal would link the Red Sea at the Gulf of Aqaba 
with the Dead Sea in the Jordan Valley. The area between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea is 
one of the most arid in the Mashreq region. On the whole, Jordan, Israel and Palestine all 
suffer from chronic freshwater shortages: the Palestinians suffering the most with around 
150m3 per capita per year while Jordanians have a per capita consumption rate of less than 
200m3 per year.32 The UN reports that a per capita consumption rate of 1,000m3 is necessary 
to meet industrial, agricultural and urban needs, while per capita consumption of water needs 
to be 500m3 per year for basic human survival needs.33 
The canal project was initially suggested as a way to combat this chronic regional 
freshwater shortage. Approximately 800 million m3/year of desalinated water would be 
provided from the canal and distributed between the three actors. Using the 430 metre drop in 
altitude to the Dead Sea from the Gulf of Aqaba, up to three desalination plants and two 
hydroelectricity plants could be constructed to provide freshwater for agricultural, urban, and 
industrial use. The hydroelectricity plants would provide 250 MW of electricity, again to be 
distributed between the three parties.34 The final aim of the project is the restoration of the 
Dead Sea to its former level; almost 30 metres higher than it is at the time of writing.35 The 
canal project has struggled to get off the drawing board as a result of continued tensions 
between Israel and Palestine and a slow pace of “normalisation” of relations between Jordan 
and Israel. It was initially suggested as part of the 1994 Peace Treaty between Jordan and 
Israel, although its roots lay much further back in history.36 A feasibility study was scheduled 
for implementation prior to the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. As a result of 
the uprising, however, the study was shelved, as Israeli-Palestinian coordination was 
obviously not possible, but neither was Jordanian-Israeli collaboration feasible due to political 
sensitivities in Jordan. Following the reduction in tensions by 2005, on 9 May of that year, the 
governments of Jordan and Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed an agreement to go 
ahead with the feasibility and environmental impact studies. A joint committee including 
Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestinian government representatives was created in order to work 
with the World Bank to issue the tenders for private sector actors to conduct the pre-
construction studies as well as contracts for the actual construction of the conduit and 
associated infrastructure. In 2008, the French-based engineering firm, Coyne et Bellier, was 
chosen to conduct the feasibility study and, according to project leader David Meehan, it is 
expected that the sea water conveyance capacity of the conduit will be over 1 billion m3/year 
while the capacity for desalinated freshwater could be approximately 800 million m3/year.37 
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The freshwater produced is to be divided between Israel, Jordan, and Palestine according to 
demand.  
Perhaps the most interesting element of the proposed canal is that it is to run from the 
Red Sea instead of the Mediterranean Sea. The Israeli government had initially proposed the 
construction of a canal from its western coastline. However, objections were made by the 
Jordanian government. The plans were shelved in favour of the Red Sea-Dead Sea canal as 
the actors involved argued that creating a canal that ran through Israel alone would not satisfy 
Jordanian security concerns and potentially further worsen the security situation in the region. 
The canal now proposed, however, will run along the border between Jordan and Israel and 
thus result in neither state having disproportionate control over it or over the other state as a 
result. The slow pace of the project’s development (has taken fifteen years simply to begin the 
feasibility studies) is significant and demonstrates the challenges of Jordanian-Israeli 
collaboration. As well as political tensions, the costs of the project have also been prohibitive. 
It is now estimated that the infrastructure will cost well over $5 billion to build. This is an 
amount that neither the Jordanians, Israelis, nor Palestinians have available, so funds have 
been pursued from external sources. Jordanian and Israeli engagement with the World Bank 
has been pivotal here as it has allowed them to not only engage with each other and 
collaborate in an institutional setting but has also allowed them to draw upon the support of 
that international organisation in securing funds for the feasibility studies. Nonetheless, 
Jordanian-Israeli engagement and integration is severely limited due to the historical conflict 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the contemporary Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territories. Economic integration has not developed since the 1994 peace treaty 
and is currently rather limited to the activity that takes place in the Jordanian Qualifying 
Industrial Zones that have to receive Israeli economic input.38 
 
Jordanian-Syrian Collaboration: Al-Wehdeh Dam  
 
While Jordan faces a severe freshwater scarcity problem, Syria does not suffer from as 
extreme a shortage of this essential resource. Nevertheless, as Tony Allan39 has pointed out, 
Syria is still a freshwater poor state that does not possess adequate supplies to meet all of its 
industrial, urban and agricultural demands. At the same time, Syria faces a more pressing 
deficit in electricity supply when compared to Jordan. The combination of these two separate 
national conditions led the Jordanian and Syrian governments to agree plans to construct a 
dam on the Yarmouk River where it runs along their shared border (before it reaches the 
Israeli-occupied Golan Heights) in 1987. This joint project aimed at storing freshwater from 
the Yarmouk River for Jordanian agricultural production while at the same time producing 
electricity via a hydro-electricity plant for Syrian consumption.40 Two key problems kept the 
implementation of the project from starting until late 2003: political disagreements between 
the two governments and a lack of financial resources. These problems have been evident in 
Jordanian-Syrian relations for much of the post-independence era. For example, an original 
agreement to share the Yarmouk River’s waters was signed in Damascus on 4 June 1953 and 
came into force several weeks later. Article 1e of this agreement called for the construction of 
a joint Jordanian-Syrian dam project on the river and Article 2 established the rights of the 
two parties to the stored water and electricity that would be produced by a hydroelectricity 
plant to be constructed at the site.41 However, political divisions, financial pressures, and 
regional instability kept the project from developing for five decades.  
With the overcoming of some of the political disagreements and the securing of the 
necessary investment funds, selection of private sector corporations to contribute to the dam’s 
construction began. A committee was formed in order to oversee the issuing of the tenders 
and the selection of the contractors to construct the dam and related infrastructure. The 
Turkish construction firm, Ozaltin, was awarded a contract in March 2003 to construct 60% 
of the overall infrastructure.42 Two Jordanian firms—the Marwan Alkurdi Company as well 
as the National Company for Roads and Bridges—were also contracted to complete the 
remaining 40% of the project.43 The Jordanian government seems to have played a more 
active role in this process, drawing on the legal documentation agreed between the two states 
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to legitimise its right to develop the project. The Syrian government appears to have been 
satisfied with its Jordanian counterpart taking up this role. In terms of funding, Jordanian and 
Syrian membership in the League of Arab States helped secure financial resources from the 
Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development in the form of a loan covering 80% of the 
project’s costs. A further loan was secured from the Abu Dhabi Development Fund and the 
Jordanian government footed the bill for the remaining costs.44 The dam was originally 
expected to cost over $400 million to build but ended up costing less than $100 million as a 
result of the plans being downsized. It was belatedly completed in 2007,45 and the dam was in 
full use by the winter of 2011, though it was not meeting the expected levels of freshwater 
reserves due to overuse of the upstream water. Political disagreements and problems with 
ensuring adherence to the 1988 agreement have caused problems in the effective utilisation of 
the dam. The Syrian agricultural sector in particular has continued to withdraw more than the 
agreed amount from upstream, meaning that the dam has not been able to fill to capacity due 
to a reduced river flow.46 Some progress has been made in rectifying this situation,47 but the 
river’s flow at the point of the dam has still not reached expected levels. 
If the theoretical assumptions that higher levels of economic integration and 
engagement in international institutions add to the potential for international cooperation over 
shared scarce resources are accurate, we should be able to observe these elements in 
Jordanian-Syrian cooperation. Plans for the bilateral management and use of freshwater 
resources between Jordan and Syria date back to the start of the post-independence era, but 
the vast majority of these have never materialised. Economic integration between Jordan and 
Syria has developed over the past three decades, and total trade levels valued slightly over 
$100 million in 1980 and $3 billion in 2010,48 with Jordanian exports of pharmaceutical 
products and phosphates and Syrian exports of food and light manufacturing representing 
important goods for both Syria and Jordan respectively. However, political integration 
between the two states has not developed to the extent that one would imagine. The hostility 
that existed between the two states through much of the Cold War era, with Syria a revisionist 
state and Jordan a conservative one, to some extent remain and have been further impacted by 
the Syrian uprising since 2011. 
A number of joint economic and political committees have been formed over the past 
three decades, but have failed to function effectively. In a study of Jordan’s inter-Arab 
relations from the 1970s, Laurie Brand has listed some of these bodies.49 For example, in 
1975, the first joint committee between the two states was established to facilitate bilateral 
economic integration, while a joint higher command was also established to coordinate their 
foreign policies. However, by 1978 their bilateral relationship had cooled significantly and by 
the early 1980s political relations had broken down as a result of Jordan siding with Iraq and 
Syria with Iran during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. The joint committee and joint higher 
command would never meet expectations. At the same time, however, joint industrial projects 
driven largely by private sector forces have witnessed some success. The Syrian-Jordanian 
Land Transport Company, for example, has steadily grown since its establishment in 1975 
and continues to be a key actor in overland transport in the region. Overall, the Jordanian-
Syrian relationship does not demonstrate a very high level of effective institutional 
engagement or economic integration, and the development and running of the Wehdeh Dam 
and the institutional agreements that accompany it have not been exemplary of effective 
international cooperation of shared resources. Nonetheless, the existence of the dam and the 
related institutional agreements do represent progress and do demonstrate that resource 
scarcity can result in international coordination. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Resource scarcity is one of the most pressing issues in international relations and will remain 
so for some time. Access to natural resources for fuel such as crude oil and natural gas will, 
for the next half century at least, be of primary concern and the issue most often impacting 
inter- and intra-state relations. However, arguably the most destabilising resource scarcity is 
that of freshwater. Fresh water is pivotal to the main forms of human action and organisation. 
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Freshwater supplies are most obviously used for human consumption, but also important is 
the use of freshwater in the most pivotal sectors of economic activity. In the MENA region as 
a whole and for Jordan in particular, this is increasingly important as freshwater is used in 
ever growing amounts in agriculture and medium to heavy industry. As Jordan’s urban 
centres continue to grow at an increasing rate due to demographic changes and urbanisation, 
and as its economy attempts to industrialise, freshwater sources will be ever more precious. It 
would be incorrect, however, to assume that the growing importance of freshwater sources 
coupled with the decreasing availability of such sources and the shared nature of Jordan’s 
main freshwater sources will lead to increased tension and competition with its neighbours. It 
is likely that Jordanian foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours with which it shares 
freshwater sources will have to respond to the challenges of freshwater scarcity. However, it 
is equally likely that Jordanian foreign policy will be driven by the need to collaborate with 
its neighbours in order to ensure freshwater security. If this is to be the case, then the 
Jordanian government, as well as others in the region, will need to develop the institutional 
mechanisms for effective engagement. Greater levels of economic integration and 
interdependence as well as engagement with international institutions can help to facilitate 
international collaboration, but, at the same time, where levels of economic integration and 
institutional engagement are low, international collaboration is likely to be hindered. In the 
case of Jordanian relations with Syria and Israel over shared freshwater sources and projects 
to manage them, the Red Sea-Dead Sea Conduit project and the Wehdeh Dam offer examples 
of both foreign policy challenges and opportunities.  
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